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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
LE ROY SWEAT and VIRGINIA
M. SWEAT, ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF BLAINE
ORVEL SWEAT, DECEASED,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
REX T. FUHRIMAN, CRAIG
FUHRIMAN, JAMES H. MADDOX and DAN ALLISON,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11,596

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JAMES H. MADDOX AND DAN ALLISON
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for wrongful death.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted summary judgment in
favor of all defendants, no cause of action, and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against defendants, Rex T. Fuhriman, Craig Fuhriman and Dan Allison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
These defendants seek affirmance of the judgment of the lower court in their favor.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 19, 1968, at approximately 2 :00 a.m.
22 miles east of Heber on Highway 40 in Wasatch
County, Blaine Orvel Sweat was struck by a westbound DeSoto automobile driven by Harold J. Sergent and killed ( R. 124, attached accident reports).
Plaintiffs are the father, mother and administratrix of the estate of Blaine Orvel Sweat, deceased ( R. 136, page 5). Plaintiffs were not witnesses
to the accident (R. 136, page 10).
Defendant Rex. T. Fuhriman, the father of
Craig Fuhriman, is the owner of the Chevrolet Impala automobile used by his son, Craig, at the time
of the accident (R. 109, page 5). Rex T. Fuhriman
did not witness the accident. Defendant James H.
Maddox is the owner of a 1966 jeep. This jeep was
loaned by him the day before the accident to his
brother-in-law, Rickie Allison. Defendant James H.
Maddox was in Price, Utah, at the time of the accident and did not witness it (R. 59).
Dan Allison, the other defendant, did not see
the accident either. He is the father of Rickie Allison, deceased.
Where the accident happened, Highway 40,
was generally straight and level in each direction
( R. 124, page 25). The roadway was marked for
one lane in each direction ( R. 124, attached diagrams to depositions).
Defendant, James H. Maddox,
2

used the Dan

Allison family automobile to go on the trip to Price.
He loaned his jeep, a 1966 model, to his brother-inlaw, Rickie Allison to use. Maddox granted Rickie
permission to use the jeep to go from Rickie's home
to Christensen Brothers farm. Rickie had a milking
job each morning and evening and needed transportation to and from work ( R. 53).
In spite of specific instructions from James
Maddox to Rickie Allison not to use the jeep for any
purpose except to go to and from milking at Christensen Brothers, the employer of Rickie Allison,
Rickie took the jeep on Saturday night and used it
to go to the Yearbook Dance at Wasatch High
School. After 5 :00 p.m. on May 18, 1968, Blaine
Sweat, the deceased, used and rode in the jeep with
Rickie Allison. After the dance, Blaine Sweat and
Rickie Allison met Craig Fuhriman and his friend,
Henry Lund, who were returning to Salt Lake City
from a fishing trip at Flaming Gorge at a service
station near the Y in Heber ( R. 136, page 14).
Fuhriman and Lund, who were driving an Impala automobile westward on Highway 40, had run
out of gas 22 miles east of Heber. Prior to running
out of gas, they parked their automobile off the
roadway facing left and left it without lights showing. They hitchhiked into Heber to obtain a container
of gasoline (R.136, pages 13, 14).
Fuhriman and Lund were not able to get a
container for gasoline at the Y Conoco service sta3

tion in Heber, but aranged with Rickie Allison and
Blaine Sweat to get a ride back to their stalled automobile ( R. 136, page 15). They left the service
station in Heber at about 1 :30 a.m. and drove in a
topless jeep. There was no conversation between
Allison and Sweat, sitting in the front, and Fuhriman and Lund sitting in the rear of the open jeep.
It was too cold and noisy to talk ( R. 136, page 18).
They drove to the Strawberry station, woke up
the operator and asked for gas and a container ( R.
136, page 16). This station is located about a mile
or mile and one-half east of where the Impala was
stalled (R. 136, page 16). The operator of this service station told the boys he had no container and
thereafter Fuhriman purchased $2 worth of gasoline and had it put in the tanks of the jeep (R. 136,
pages 16, 17). The boys intended to siphon gas from
one vehicle to the other ( R. 136, page 17) .
After getting the $2 worth of gas, Allison drove
the jeep back to the Chevrolet Impala (R. 136, page
18) . Rickie Allison drove back west past the stalled
Impala, parked along the north edge of the roadway
tur,ned around and then parked the jeep facing east
along the north edge of the roadway in the westbound lane ( R. 136, pages 19, 20). He left the lights
of the jeep on and activated the flasher lights (R.
136, pages 22, 23). The jeep was parked so that the
cap to its gas tank matched the cap of the stalled
Impala with a space of about 3 feet in between.
No one went to the east or west to flag or warn
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traffic. The jeep blocked the westbound roadway
and its lights shined down the straight road to the
east ( R. 136, page 26).
Rickie Allison took the siphon hose and endeavored to start to siphon gasoline from one tank
to the other (R. 136, page 24). Almost immediately
he got a mouth full of gasoline and had to quit. He
moved to the rear of the stalled Impala operated by
Fuhriman and was spitting out gasoline (R. 136,
page 25). Blaine Sweat, without instructions from
anyone, picked up the siphon hose and endeavored
to start to siphon. While this was taking place, Craig
Fuhriman and Henry Lund were standing along the
edge of the jeep west of Sweat a few feet (R. 136,
page 26). While Blaine Sweat was siphoning, Craig
Fuhriman looked to the east and saw a vehicle approaching at a speed judged to be about 60 miles an
hour about a block away (R. 136, page 62). He
watched this vehicle for half a block and realized it
was not going to stop and shouted a warning to the
others and started to run ( R. 136, page 62). Blaine
Sweat was siphoning gas when the warning was
shouted (R. 136, page 61). Fuhriman does not know
exactly where Lund and Allison were when he started to run ( R. 136, page 63). Craig Fuhriman took
three or four steps west and then was struck and
knocked down (R. 136, page 64). After this impact,
he picked himself up and observed that the jeep was
still standing on the roadway facing east with its
lights on. He also observed that a car had struck
5

the rear of the unlighted Impala and pushed it off
the roadway across the north barrow pit. After the
impact Rickie Allison and Blaine Sweat were lying
unconcious in the barrow pit northwest of where last
seen (R. 136, page 66). Officer Gile's testimony
shows that Rickie Allison was standing to the rear
of the Impala when it was struck by a westbound
DeSoto driven by Harold J. Sergent. Sergent, who
was driving west, went off the road on his right
to avoid the jeep and struck the rear of the Impala
after hitting Rickie Lee Allison (R. 124, attached
accident report).
POINT I
APPELLANTS' BRIEF DOES NOT SUPPORT
AN APPEAL AGAINST MADDOX.

Appellants in their brief state no ground or
point supporting a reversal of the judgment in favor
of James Maddox. The general rule is that when the
appellant fails to set forth .a specification of error
as against a party in a brief, a higher court may
affirm the judgment without reference to the merits
of the case.
In Roth vs. Palutzke, (1960) 350 P.2d 358, the
plaintiff failed to set forth .any specifications of error in his brief as required by the Supreme Court
rule of the State of Montana.

Deemer vs. Reichart, (1965) 195 Kan. 232, 404
P.2d 174, holds the reviewing court was required to
take as established fact that party was negligent in
parking a truck on highway where appellant failed
6

to raise the issue in Statement of Points on Appeal
as to existence of negligence.
In Lepasiotes vs. Dinsdale, (1952) 121 Utah
359, 242 P.2d 297, this court affirmed a judgment
where the appellants failed to specifically assign
error. This court said:
"As to any prejudicial error claimed,
none of the many rulings on admission of evidence was assigned specifically on appeal as
constituting prejudicial error, so that any decision thereon would require discussion of all
objections, - no one of which plaintiff has
had an opportunity to meet in her brief because of such nondesignation. Therefore, we
feel constrained not to review those matters
which plaintiff cannot defend against because
not called to attention by her opponents."
In In Re Lavelle's Estate, this court said, insofar as it is practical, an appellant who challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the court's
finding of undue influence must detail, with citation
to the record where appropriate, the particulars
where in the evidence touching the finding is inconsistent therewith or is not enough moment to sustain
it.
The purpose of a brief is to pinpoint how it is
alleged the lower court erred. Since appellant's brief
sets out no points or grounds as to alleged error in
granting the judgment in favor of Maddox and against appellants, it is presumed the lower court did
not err.
7

Unless this court is clairvoyant, it like Maddox
and his attorneys is prejudiced by appellants' failure
to assign specific error.
Matters not called to the attention of a party
should not be raised on appeal.
POINT II
IF RI CK IE ALLISON WAS NEGLIGENT,
BLAINE ORVEL SWEAT WAS NEGLIGENT.

When Blaine Orvel Sweat was struck by Sergent's automobile, he was engaged in siphoning gas
from the tank of the jeep to the tank of the Impala.
No one directed him to do this. Blaine Sweat was a
volunteer. All of the boys, including Blaine Orvel
Sweat, knew the jeep was parked on the roadway
with its lights shining east in the westbound lane of
the roadway. The boys knew the jeep was parked
on the wrong side of the road. None of the boys
agreed to act as a lookout for the person siphoning
gas. No one was keeping a lookout for oncoming
traffic. No one put warning signs or signals up
ahead. No one asked Blaine Orvel Sweat to do what
he was doing at the time he was struck.
If it was negligence for Rickie Allison to park
the jeep as he did, it follows since these facts were
known by Sweat it was contributory negligence for
Sweat to do what he was doing under the circumstances. Sweat is identified with whatever negligence occurred at the time and place of the accident.
Sweat, as an occupant of the jeep, sitting in the
front seat when it was stopped, knew exactly the
8

manner in which it was placed in the roadway. The
stopping of the jeep, the leaving of the lights shining easterly, and the siphoning of gas were done
with his acquiescence, consent and approval.
Maybee vs. Maybee, (1932) 79 Utah 585, 11
P.2d 973, is a case in point. This case arose before
the passing of the Utah guest law. The defendant
driver, Mrs. Maybee, the mother of the plaintiff,
was very nearsighted and wore eyeglasses. The
daughter, the plaintiff, knew her mother required
eyeglasses for driving. The daughter knew before
the accident occurred that her mother was driving
without using her eyeglasses and knew that her
mother relied on eyeglasses to see. This court in affirming a directed verdict in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff in that case said:
" * * * At the time of the accident plaintiff
was eighteen years of age having become of
that age April 23rd previously. Plaintiff testified that she had driven a car since she was
sixteen, was familiar with the operation of
the Dodge coupe and has alternated with the
mother in driving the car on their trip East
and the return. There is no evidence that
plaintiff protested against her mother's driving without glasses or that she offered to do
the driving after the glasses were broken. It
is not disputed that every fact, circumstance,
and condition relied on by the plaintiff as constituting negligence on the part of the def endant was fully known to an appreciated by
plaintiff, a n d that, notwithstanding h e r
knowledge of the defect in the eyesight of her
mother and the fact that she was driving
9

without the aid of glasses, the plaintiff paid
no attention to the conditions in the road, but
was content to sit by and read a book while
her
driving at a
of forty
to forty-five miles an hour. If it was negligence for the def end.ant to drive at this speed
with her vision impaired as it was, and withr
out the aid of g"lasses, it would follow that,
where all these facts are fully known to and
appreciated by the pl.aintiff, and notwithr
standing such facts and such knowledge she
was willing to be driven in the car, she not
only assumed the risk or hazard to her ou.m
safety, which resulted from such driving, but
by her acquiescence, was guilty of indepenr
dent negligence which contributed to the accident. The plaintiff identified herself with
whatever negligence there was on the part
of the mother because of her knowledge of
all such facts and her approval, consent, and
acquiescence in the driving of the car by her
mother." (Emphasis added).
Esernia vs. Overland Moving Co., (1949) 115
Utah 519, 206 P.2d 621, is another case involving
acquiescence of conduct. In this case, the plaintiff
hitched a ride with defendant's driver near the outskirts of Elko, Nevada, to go to Salt Lake City, Utah.
At the time the plaintiff entered the truck he was
told by the defendant driver that he was tired,
weary and sleepy and the driver said he had driven
straight through from San Francisco, California.
Shortly thereafter, the driver of the defendant's vehicle went off the pavement and onto the shoulder
of the road, having dozed at the wheel. After this
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incident the driver and the plaintiff continued on,
the driver merely requesting the plaintiff and
another Marine, also picked up, to talk to him so he
would remain awake. Again the driver dozed and
went off the road and this time the van was upset
and the plaintiff was injured. In this case there was
no dispute that the driver dozed and that the plaintiff knew he was weary and tired. It was undisputed
that the plaintiff had an opportunity to leave the
truck but still he elected to remain.
In the above case the Supreme Court affirmed
a judgment for the defendant, saying:
"The evidence was uncontroverted that
appellant knew that the driver was sleepy at
the time he accepted the ride and also when
the truck ran off the road the first time.
Thereafter he had an opportunity to leave the
truck when it stopped at Wendover or Delle,
or he could have left the truck at any other of
the towns between Elko and the point of the
accident, of the existence of which this court
can take judicial notice, but he did not leave.
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2,
Sec. 466, states that a plaintiff's contributory
negligence may be ' (a) an intentional and unreasonable exposure of himself to danger
created by the defendant's negligence of
which danger the plaintiff knows or has reason to know * * * ' and that ' * * * (c)
* * *a
form of the type of contributory negligence
with in
.(a) consists of the plaintiff's entrusting his
to a third person whom he knows to be incompetent, customarily negligent or ill-equipped * * * '"
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In Landru vs. Stensrud, ( 1945) 219 Minn. 227,
17 N.W. 2d 322, an action was brought by an automobile guest for personal injuries suffered when the
automobile which had been driven by the defendant
on the ice of the lake in a fishing excursion broke
through the ice. In this case the court affirmed a
judgment for the defendants saying that the risk
of injury from the known general hazards of the
undertaking such as driving on ice constituted contributory negligence in the assumption of this risk
or was not evidence of driver's negligence in respect
to the condition of the ice and, therefore, was insufficient to go to the jury.
In Burns vs. F'isher (1957) 132 Mont. 26, 313
P.2d 1044, plaintiff-decedent remained in a truck
stalled on a highway and failed to put out flares in
violation of statute. In this case the court ruled
plaintiff could not recover because the decedent was
contributorily negligent.
Section 466 Restatement of the Law Second,
Torts 2d, provides:

"§ 466. Types of Contributory Negligence
The plaintiff's contributory negligence may
be either
(a) an intentional and unreasonable exposure of himself to danger created by the defendant's negligence, of which danger the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know, or
( b) conduct which, in respects other
than those stated in Clause (a), falls short
12

of the standard to which the reasonable man
should conform in order to protect himself
from harm."
The law required Blaine Sweat to act as areasonably prudent person under the circumstances.
If it was negligence for Rickie Allison to do
what he did, Blaine Orvel Sweat was equally guilty
of contributory negligence proximately causing his
injuries and death.

Appellant's statement that Blaine Sweat never
agreed at any time to the conduct of Fuhriman or
Allison is without support. As a matter of fact, the
record shows he volunteered to siphon the gas and
acquiesced Allison's conduct.

CONCLUSION
The summary judgment in favor of James H.
Maddox should be affirmed because:
1. Appellants have not specified any error in

granting judgment in favor of him.

2. There is no evidence that James H. Maddox
was negligent in loaning the jeep to Rickie Allison.
The summary judgment in favor of James H.
Maddox and Dan Allison should be affirmed because if it was negligent for Rickie Allison to do
what he did, it was, under the same circumustances,
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contributory negligence for Blaine Orvel Sweat to '
act as he did at the time and place of the accident.
Respectfully submitted,
Raymond M. Berry
Seventh Floor Continental
Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
John L. Chidester
51 West Center Street
Heber City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents, J a m e s H.
Maddox and Dan Allison
MAILING NOTICE
I hereby certify by United States Mail, postage
prepaid, I mailed two copies of the fore going brief
to J. Harold Call, Attorney at Law, 23 Center Street,
Heber City, Utah; F. Robert Bayle, Attorney at
Law, Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah; and John L. Chidester, 51 West Center Street,
Heber City, Utah, this ________ day of September, 1969.

Raymond M. Berry
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